Canada should maintain and exercise some control over the soldiers she sent to war. But there was no agreement--not even a plan to provoke disagreement--on how, or by whom, or to what degree, this control was to be exercised. With no plan to follow, with no precedents to guide, and confronted with the immense and novel problems of a nation thrust into war, it might be expected that the initial improvisation of a method to control Canadian troops abroad would be followed by disorder, dissatisfaction, and demands for reorganization, and that this cycle might be repeated until a comparatively satisfactory method was evolved., Coupled with this question of controlling Canadian troops.
extremely excitable, impatient of control and almost impossible to work with; and during the remainder his conduct and speech were so eccentric as to justify the conclusion that his mind was unbalanced."6
To a personality of this type, partially trained in military theory and in the practice of war, the idea of personal command and control came automatically an'd naturally. From the outbreak of war he considered himself Canada's "War Minister," attended Cabinet meetings in uniform, 7 took action on many important matters without consulting the Cabinet, and generally stepped outside the unwritten rules of Cabinet government. In the first months of intense activity and uncertainty these assumptions passed, if not unnoticed, at least unchecked, since they could be balanced against the exceptional service which Hughes rendered.
While Sir Robert, for more than two years, continued to support and defend his militia minister, other members of the Cabinet--particularly Sir George Foster--were offended by his attitude, and fearful of the consequences of his unilateral actions. When the war settled down to the bloody attrition of the Western Front, Colonel Hughes's gifts of energy and enthusiasm became less important than his preoccupation with detail, always distracting and sometimes ludicrous, and his .apparent inability to organize and SOne must realize, however, that there was never any attempt by the Canadian government to obtain more than a general control of the administration of the Canadian forces, especially in England, in such matters as appointments, equipment, and organization. Naturally, there was close co-operation with the War Office.
9Order-in-council P.C. 107, dated Jan. 15, 1915.
and he did not possess the ear of the minister. It therefore came to pass that, confining his activities to the supervision of training, and the actual despatch of reinforcements, he allowed all questions of policy to be decided by Carson, who extended his powers eventually to include "anything and everything" and, besides his military interests, dispensed political patronage as directed by the minister from Ottawa, generally in the form of promotions or appointments within the forces in England. •SManuscr|pt, "Offic{al History," vol. II.
When in
• that while I as your representative make a definite request to the War Office, they, instead of answering me write Sir George Perley, and that gentleman telephones to me, and shows me the letter, and then goes in the roundabout way of advising General MacDougall in the premises. I have mildly remonstrated with the War Office more than once over this procedure and they simply say that while they would prefer to deal with me, they cannot ignore the Canadian High Commissioner until they are practically told to do so. What are we to do about this matter.
It is most unfortunate, most confusing, and gives rise at times to considerable delays .... ,,2s
By 1916 the crying need for a complete reorganization, and for the immediate separation of the political, military, and civil circles of administration was evident. General Carson had, for months past, been attempting to obtain authority from Sir Sam to effect some reorganization. He had told the minister in December, 1915:
As I have said to you on numerous occasions there are minor details that really cannot be regulated from Ottawa, but no one on this side of the Atlantic Ocean has an ounce of authority in the premises. There are many abuses to correct, there are many errors to make right, there are many wrongs to put right and there are 2•Duguid, 02•cial History, 128.
•aManuscript, "Official History," vol. II.
•4Ibid.
•SDuguid, Off•/al History, appendix 229, pp. 161-2. •sC.F. •9Ibid.
•Olbid.
• Ibid.
•Ibid.
•sUniversity of Toronto Library, Diaries of Sir George Foster, Sept. 22, 1914.
• Another critic described the state of affairs as being "too awful for words. There is absolutely no organization, no system, no enthusiasm; in fact the whole situation is weary and sad. "58 II To set matters straight in England Sir Sam had in mind a simple plan, namely the Sub-Militia Council which General Carson had been advocating for months past. He proceeded to implement this plan in his direct and headstrong fashion and to put it into effect, notwithstanding the direct instructions of the 
Might I point out to you that the Sub-Militia Council have already--acting on your instructions--appointed Major Oulster as Secretary of the Sub-Militia
Council, and I would point out that Oulster is an expert office man, having been at this work since he was 18 years old .... I point out these matters to you so that you may understand that we have an expert office staff here who are surely entitled to every consideration.
In your letter you say that "Major Green, in addition to his other duties, etc., etc.," Might I point out to you that I have no more idea than the Man in the •2Montreal Gazette, Sept. 14, 15, 1916.
•'•C.F. 8-1-106, Hughes to Carson, Sept. 18, 1916. In spite of interference and uncertainty as to its status, the Council, to its credit, got quickly to work. Although hampered by the fact that it was composed of officers, most of whom lacked the experience acquired through the command of troops in action, and by the faults common to all committees, it did its work reasonably well. At its weekly meetings, which often lasted, after a luncheon adjournment, into the late afternoon, it dealt not only with the everyday business of the Canadian forces, but also began implementation of reforms which had so long been needed. All units in England were made available as reinforcements, even if earmarked for Sir Sam's proposed 5th and 6th Divisions? A standing sub-committee was set up to deal with surplus officers and it was decided that they were to be given a short trip to the front and then returned to Cana. da. *s In an attempt to limit staffs an order was issued that establishments were to be drawn up by administrative units and submitted for approval. An attempt was made to reduce the large number, 3,500 to 5,000, of military clerks •ø3Montreal Gazette, Oct. 6, 1016.
•04Borden, Memoirs, II, 568.
•0*Montreal Gazette, Oct. 9, 10, 1916.
Our overseas force already despatched to Europe is greater by 100,000 men than the effective strength of the British regular army before the commencement of the war... expenditure thereon is larger than the total annual revenue of the country be[ore the war... the most effective control of expenditure under the war appropriation act must be provided... I realize that you have done much to assist in cutting down expenditure. The proposal embodied in the draft orderin-council is not intended as a regulation upon your efforts or your administration. I thoroughly appreciate the great ability, the wonderful energy and the unequalled resourcefulness which you have placed at the service of the country ever since the outbreak of war? 9
To these proposals Sir Sam was strongly opposed. Speaking to the prime minister, "He objected strongly and argued against it, saying that there would be nothing left for him, that he would be humiliated and that he would have to leave the Government."nø On the 19th, the same day as this conversation with Sir Robert, news of this new development leaked out to the press, which reported definitely the next day that: "Canada's military affairs in England are to be placed directly under the supervision of a I regret that I cannot endorse your statement that "it is apparent that we should have a more efficient organization in Great Britain."... you speak of the need ooe a resident minister... it would be absurd. There is no more necessity for a resident minister in Britain than there is for a resident minister at our camps in British Columbia, Calgary., Camp Borden, Valcartier, etc. Indeed, there is less need in Britain, because where formerly General Carson was alone the representative, he is now surrounded by a sub-Militia Council composed of the ablest officers to be found to advise and report to headquarters at Ottawa on all military matters.
They have no final say--they merely report to Ottawa--and there is no more delay than there is in coming from Vancouver Island or from Halifax. Further, from a constitutional viewpoint, it is more than absurd ....
As an intermediary in all diplomatic relations concerning our military. force in Britain and at the front, we secured the services of one of the ablest diplomats, namely, Sir Max Aitken .... I can not concur in the proposal to destroy these plans .... n3
The pt{me minister replied on October 26, stating that he did not concur in the v{ew that the change was a return to the old system and denying that there was any motive except "to secure the greatest efficiency and the most economical administration that can be obtained. "u4 He pointed out that the "war appropriation had been voted not to any particular department... but to the •Borden, Memoir's, II, 569.
• •33Ibid., Nov. 14, 1916. In his Memoirs (II, 570-1) Borden has since explained why Hughes was not dismissed before: "I knew that Hughes had a considerable following, the force of which was an undetermined factor, and, while I felt that his continued presence in the Government was a handicap rather than a support, I determined to let him continue until I was perfectly sure that his dismissal would not entail any serious danger The Council had already, after Sir Sam's return to Canada, been deprived of nearly all independent authority, it being necessary to emphasize its "acting" and "subordinate" authority. Now, just when a new organization chart was ready, they were confronted by a new master, who, if less spectacular, was no less determined to be the final authority. A firm note made this clear 
